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          <title>Tax Foundation - Commentary</title>
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<title>Double Taxation of Hospital Services Pushes Patient Bills Up</title>
<link>http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/23286.html</link>
<description> &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;This commentary was published in the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=23328&quot;&gt;July 1, 2008 issue of the Heartland Institute's Budget &amp;amp; Tax News&lt;/a&gt;. It references &lt;a href=&quot;/news/show/23111.html&quot;&gt;this earlier Tax Foundation study&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As medical costs continue to rise, an under-appreciated factor is states' double taxation of hospital services. In many states, hospitals must pay sales tax on purchases of medicine and equipment&amp;mdash;taxes that get passed on to patients in the form of higher bills.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In a new report, &amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/news/show/23111.html&quot;&gt;States Should Avoid Sales Taxes on Nonprofit Hospitals&lt;/a&gt;,&amp;quot; the Washington, DC-based Tax Foundation found only seven states exempt all hospital purchases from the sales tax and six states impose sales tax on even nonprofit hospital purchases.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;Ideally, a sales tax should be levied on all goods and services sold at retail, and to prevent distortions and hidden taxes, it should be levied only once on each good or service sold at retail,&amp;quot; the study points out. &amp;quot;Just as imposing sales tax on manufacturing inputs leads to hidden taxes and pyramiding on retail consumers, so too does imposing a state sales tax on hospital purchases lead to hidden taxes and pyramiding on patients.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The report reviews all 50 states and the District of Columbia to see which impose sales taxes on hospital purchases of medicine, equipment, and other materials.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;http://www.heartland.org/apps/images/imgPics/Double%20Table.jpg&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; alt=&quot;Double Table&quot; width=&quot;414&quot; height=&quot;885&quot; align=&quot;middle&quot; /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Thirteen states have a generic sales tax exemption for purchases made by any nonprofit or charity, the study notes. Thirteen others have provisions specifically exempting nonprofit hospital purchases from the sales tax but not necessarily purchases by other nonprofits or charities.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Seven states exempt inputs purchased by all hospitals. Arkansas and North Carolina exempt certain purchases by nonprofit hospitals.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Seven Tax Everything&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Seven states are the worst on taxing hospital inputs. Louisiana, Oklahoma, and West Virginia tax all inputs purchased by nonprofit hospitals, and Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming tax all but medical equipment purchases. Oklahoma's tax is upside-down: It taxes hospitals' inputs but exempts retail sales.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Greg Barker, director of planning and business development with Touro Infirmary in New Orleans, estimated his facility spends $4 million annually in sales taxes on hospital inputs.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;This disadvantage in the marketplace is not good tax policy and does not offer fairness among area hospitals because the tax burden is not equally applied to all facilities,&amp;quot; Barker said. &amp;quot;A $4 million savings goes a long way to improving the financial status of one of New Orleans' longest-serving hospitals.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Tennessee Hospital Sues&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the 1970s in Tennessee, Parkridge Hospital in Chattanooga brought a lawsuit after the state ordered it to pay sales tax on its business-to-business purchase of human blood for patient transfusions, even though Tennessee law limits the sales tax to retail sales. Tennessee legislators responded by enacting a specific sales tax exemption for blood purchased by charities.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;While the &amp;quot;blood exemption&amp;quot; is still on the books, many other purchases of inputs by hospitals in Tennessee remain subject to the sales tax. Patients in Tennessee thus pay hidden taxes embedded in their hospital bills, and Tennessee's tax system is less transparent and neutral.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Even states that exempt nonprofit hospital purchases tax other business-to-business transactions that should be exempt.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Business-to-Business Taxes&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Of those states that impose a state-level sales tax (45, plus the District of Columbia), many impose sales taxes on business-to-business transactions that do not involve a final retail sale, the study notes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;[M]ore than half the states (27 plus D.C.) tax two or more inputs. 14 states and D.C. tax the purchase of manufacturing machinery, an especially distortionary tax, and Hawaii imposes sales tax on all but one examined business-to-business transactions,&amp;quot; the report notes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;For many states, exempting inputs from the sales tax should be a part of any tax reform effort,&amp;quot; the study concludes.&lt;/p&gt; 		 		</description>
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<pubDate>Sun, 15 Jun 2008 00:00:00 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Unique Opportunity Is at Hand for Far-Reaching Federal Tax Reform</title>
<link>http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/23262.html</link>
<description> &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;This commentary appeared in the July 1, 2008, issue of Budget &amp;amp; Tax News, published by the Heartland Institute.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;For the first time since 1986, the stars may be aligning for a grand bipartisan compromise on fundamental federal tax reform.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Regardless of who wins in November, the next president and Congress will have to deal with the collision of two cataclysmic tax events: The 2011 expiration of the Bush tax cuts and the growing irritation of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The seeds for compromise lie in the fact that both sides have something to gain by addressing these problems at once. Naturally, Republicans want to avert the largest tax hike in history by maintaining the lower tax rates on income, capital gains, dividends, and married families with children. Meanwhile, Democrats will be brought to the table by the fact that the AMT is largely a Blue State problem, mostly affecting those living in high-tax and high-income states such as California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;43 Million Pay Nothing&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;The first land mine is the distribution of the tax burden itself. The 2001 and 2003 tax cuts knocked millions of lower-income people from the tax rolls. When Bill Clinton left office, some 29 million tax filers had no income tax liability after they took advantage of their credits and deductions. Today, the number of &amp;quot;non-payers&amp;quot; has grown to more than 43 million, or one out of every three Americans who file a tax return.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And since so many lawmakers see the IRS as a giant ATM dispensing &amp;quot;refundable&amp;quot; credits, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, it will be very difficult to convince them to support fundamental tax reform.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;With the nation's tax burden now so concentrated at the top--the top 20 percent of taxpayers pay about 86 percent of all the income taxes&amp;mdash;any tax reform plan is caught in a rhetorical Catch 22; tax reform equals &amp;quot;tax cuts for the rich.&amp;quot; Enter land mine number two: AMT and the interests of Democrats.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Although the vast majority of households affected by the AMT earn between $100,000 and $500,000, Democrats have masterfully positioned it as a middle-income issue. Wrapping fundamental tax reform around AMT reform could inoculate the debate from the predictable class warfare diversions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Considering these land mines, how do we craft a politically realistic tax reform plan?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Step 1: Eliminate tax exemptions and deductions.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;More than 80 percent of the benefits of these tax deductions flow to households earning more than $80,000, and more than half of the benefits flow to those making more than $118,000.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Eliminating these deductions would solve several problems. It would free up dollars for marginal rate cuts to keep effective rates down, and it would add greater simplicity and equity to the tax code.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Affluent taxpayers may be the initial beneficiaries of these tax exemptions and deductions. But in the end, the real economic subsidies flow to well-heeled interest groups such as the housing industry, state and local governments, and public employee unions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In particular, the state and local tax deduction allows local politicians and school districts to shift as much as one-third of the cost of any tax hike along to Uncle Sam&amp;mdash;and thus other taxpayers.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Step 2: Make any tax reform a tax cut and tax simplification.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Next, one must recognize that tax cuts will always generate more support than a revenue-neutral tax shift. A 2007 Tax Foundation/Harris Interactive Poll found about half of all American adults would give up their credits and deductions for an across-the-board cut in their income tax rates.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The repeal of deductions, as outlined above, would fund significant marginal rate cuts. However, the task of mobilizing the other half of Americans who said they were not sure or who rejected the idea will require the sweetener of a lower tax bill as well as the promise of a simpler 1040 form.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Step 3: Continue to shield low-income earners with a super-deduction.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Politicians are not likely to put the non-payers back on the tax rolls by shrinking the value of the personal exemption, standard deduction, or child credit. With the political consensus that some low-income people should be protected from income taxes, the practical solution is to collapse the various credits and deductions into a super-deduction that accomplishes what current policies already do inefficiently: Eliminate the income tax bill for a family of four earning up to about $42,000.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Continuing to protect low-income taxpayers in this way will help earn goodwill from the left without actually creating any new programs.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Step 4: Make everyone a stakeholder.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;An ideal plan would take this process a step further (as did the 1986 act) by slashing all tax rates equally, giving every taxpayer a stake in the reform. Better yet, the plan could condense the number of brackets to no more than two, as existed in 1988.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Such a tax code would be simpler, fairer, and closer to the kind of efficiency economists have long called for. It would reduce the compliance costs for families and small businesses. It would almost certainly strengthen the American economy and help move the tax code back to its proper purpose of revenue-raising and away from its current distorted function of social policymaking.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Step 5: Fend off the special interests.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;None of this is to say that fundamental tax reform will come easily or cheaply. With absolute certainty, every interest group and lobby will line the halls of Congress demanding their interest have protections carved into the new legislation. Advocacy groups of every stripe will take to the airwaves bemoaning the plight of their specific interest. They will scream that this new tax bill will evict people from their homes, leave children hungry on the street, and force seniors into destitution.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Of course, like most cries from special interests, none of this would be true. What would be true is that the United States would enjoy one of the best and most effective tax systems the world over. The new tax code would still show compassion for the poor and take a hefty chunk from the rich, while becoming considerably more fair and equitable.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Scott Hodge&lt;/em&gt; (&lt;a href=&quot;mailto:hodge@taxfoundation.org&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;hodge@taxfoundation.org&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;) &lt;em&gt;is president of the Tax Foundation. An earlier version of this essay appeared in the February/March 2008 issue of&lt;/em&gt; The Ripon Forum, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.riponsociety.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;www.riponsociety.org&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;em&gt;Reprinted with permission.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 06 Jun 2008 00:00:00 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Cigarette Taxes Are Fueling Organized Crime</title>
<link>http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/23196.html</link>
<description> &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;This commentary appeared in the Wall Street Journal on May 7, 2008.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121012081570272357.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries&quot;&gt;Cigarette Taxes Are Fueling Organized Crime&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Last month, New York law enforcement authorities announced the arrest of Queens resident Rafea al-Nablisi for smuggling 12,000 cartons of cigarettes a week. It was not the first such arrest, and thanks to New York's latest cigarette tax hike, it will not be the last.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On April 23, less than two weeks after Mr. Nablisi's arrest was made public, Gov. David Paterson signed into law a $1.25 per-pack tax hike on top of the state's $1.50 per-pack tax. That's in addition to New York City's own $1.50 per-pack tax. Come July 1, New York City's smokers will be paying on average $9 a pack for legal cigarettes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But if history is any guide, most cigarettes sold will actually be trucked up from Virginia, or shipped in from China, by &amp;quot;butt-leggers&amp;quot; who can make over $1 million on each tractor-trailer load of smuggled smokes. The blunt fact, which politicians of both political parties are determined to ignore, is that high cigarette taxes in New York have led to a bloody, decades-long smuggling epidemic.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;While the problem first surfaced during the Great Depression, tax hikes in the early 1960s created a major profit opportunity for smugglers and kicked the epidemic into high gear. By 1967, a quarter of the cigarettes consumed in the Empire State were bootlegged. New York City's finance administrator labeled cigarette smuggling the &amp;quot;principal stoking facility of the engine of organized crime.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Crime rapidly spread beyond New York's borders, as trucks carrying cigarettes across the country were hijacked and businesses selling them robbed to supply New York's black market. In 1972, the chairman of a New York commission told Congress that retailers and other workers were &amp;quot;confronted almost daily with the risk and dangers of personal violence which are now inherent in their industry.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;State and city officials responded with mandatory prison sentences and expanded police powers of search and seizure. But in 1973 a state commission found the crackdown to be &amp;quot;completely ineffective and a failure.&amp;quot; Desperate state officials formed a special task force that proposed abolishing the city's cigarette excise. Gov. Malcolm Wilson embraced the idea, explaining: &amp;quot;One major incentive to organized crime is the high New York City cigarette taxes, piled on top of the state tax, which have made that city the promised land for cigarette bootleggers.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Fuhgedaboutit. Parochial politics scuttled any possibility that the tax would be abolished. But a series of homicides, including witness murder, discouraged lawmakers from further tax hikes in the late 1970s and early '80s. High inflation in those years drove cigarette prices up, but the fixed excise tax&amp;mdash;the smuggler's profit margin&amp;mdash;declined by more than 40%, greatly reducing bootlegging and related crime.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Lawmaker memories are short, however, and the state again began raising the cigarette tax in the 1980s. As a state tax enforcement official noted, it soon became &amp;quot;literally more profitable to hijack a cigarette-delivery truck than an armored truck.&amp;quot; More tax hikes followed in the 1990s. City and state records of tax-paid cigarettes show sales plummeting, despite stable smoking rates. This signals the resurgence of smuggling and large-scale tax evasion.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms said in September 2002 of New York's cigarette smuggling, &amp;quot;Traditional organized crime is involved, terrorist groups are involved, and street gangs are involved.&amp;quot; Rivalry among these groups has resulted in numerous shootings and homicides.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The connection to terrorism is no exaggeration. When New York police cracked another smuggling ring in 2005, they uncovered a multimillion dollar flow of funds from New York City to unknown individuals in the Middle East. Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly gave voice to the obvious conclusion: Terrorists probably got the money.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Just a few weeks before that 2005 bust, Buffalo-area businessman Aref Ahmed had been sentenced to three years and a month for cigarette smuggling. The feds said he'd used the racket to fund &amp;quot;scholarships&amp;quot; at terrorist training camps in Afghanistan during the spring of 2001. Going back to 1993, counterfeit cigarette stamps were found in the apartment of the first World Trade Center bombers.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Politicians continue to use the health of smokers as their excuse for higher cigarette taxes. This view is myopic. As Gov. Wilson argued three decades ago, high cigarette taxes are bad public policy because of their effect on the rest of us. In the 1960s and '70s, organized crime exploited high cigarette taxes at our expense. Today we face an even deadlier adversary.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;****&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Mr. Fleenor is chief economist of the Tax Foundation and author of &amp;quot;Cigarette Taxes, Black Markets, and Crime: Lessons from New York's 50-Year Losing Battle&amp;quot; (Cato Institute, 2003).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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<pubDate>Wed, 07 May 2008 00:00:00 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Beacon Hill's Gift to the Black Market</title>
<link>http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/23162.html</link>
<description> &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;This commentary &lt;/em&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2008/04/26/beacon_hills_gift_to_the_black_market/&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;appeared in the Boston Globe on April 26, 2008&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;.&lt;/em&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;According to police, Richard &amp;quot;Pops&amp;quot; Picardi, a 76-year Revere man who hobbled about on a prosthetic leg, was a purveyor of many vices. For drug addicts he supplied OxyContin, Percocet, and other narcotics, investigators say. To smokers he supplied cheap, tax-free cigarettes out of a Chelsea taxi office.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This operation came to an end last week after police and Suffolk County prosecutors closed in on him. Yet such busts do little to stem the flow of illegal smokes into the Bay State. Massachusetts is awash in bootleg cigarettes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;High state cigarette taxes have turned packs of cigarettes into pots of gold for criminals, spawning a massive black market supplied by both smugglers and thieves who can quickly unload stolen cigarettes for cash.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Legislators on Beacon Hill are now planning to almost double the criminal profit margin by hiking the state cigarette tax by another buck a pack. This will only place more citizens in harm's way.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Bay State is no stranger to cigarette tax-induced crime. Soon after the state tax was enacted in 1939, legal, tax-paid sales fell, as cigarettes were smuggled in or diverted from tax-free stocks and sold in the ordinary market. Merchants in neighboring states also began advertising the tax-free prices available in their stores.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Massachusetts tax authorities responded by stationing agents in neighboring states to photograph border shoppers lured by bargain smokes. That failed, and so did more frequent audits of wholesalers and retailers. The criminals proved to be wily, and, like the famous liquor bootleggers during Prohibition, these &amp;quot;butt-leggers&amp;quot; sometimes outran enforcement agents in souped-up cars.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Over the next quarter century a stalemate of sorts set in between tax-enforcers and tax-evaders. Taxes increased slowly, only at about the rate of inflation, so evasion remained more or less constant.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Surgeon General's famous report on smoking and health in 1964 changed everything. Lawmakers reacted by more than doubling cigarette excises over the next decade, causing cigarette bootlegging and related crime to explode.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;By the mid-1970s, the state's highest-in-the-nation tax created horrendous evasion problems. A 1977 federal report found that Massachusetts smokers were buying 76 million untaxed packs annually, and labeled the state's bootlegging problems as &amp;quot;serious.&amp;quot; A subsequent state report agreed, and state officials concluded that profits in the illegal cigarette trade were large enough to attract professional criminals who also supplied this vast, illicit market by hijacking cigarette trucks and robbing retail or wholesale locations.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At a 1977 congressional hearing on the national cigarette bootlegging problem, Senator Edward Kennedy noted that the Mob's entry into the racket had led to &amp;quot;increasing violent crime: extortion and bribery, truck hijackings, armed robberies, serious assaults, and even murder.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;State officials made the usual futile gestures, forming task forces with federal authorities and nearby states. Nothing made a dent. In 1980, combined federal and state enforcement efforts netted just 5,800 cartons of illegal smokes, about the number smuggled in three hours on a typical day.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The emergence of this large illicit market, coupled with the inability of enforcement officials to do much about it, helped discourage additional large tax hikes for more than a decade and a half. This allowed inflation to gradually whittle down the excise to levels not seen since the early 1960s. By the early 1990s, this de facto tax reduction had largely eliminated the state's problems with large-scale evasion.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But lawmakers' memories are woefully short. At the beginning of 1993, the state cigarette excise nearly doubled to 51 cents per pack. Smoking in Massachusetts dipped slightly, following the nationwide trends. You would never know the effect was so modest from looking at the state's records of tax-paid cigarettes&amp;mdash;sales of those plummeted. But smuggling boomed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Additional tax hikes in 1996 and 2002 have pushed the tax to its current level of $1.51 per pack. The resulting increase in border activity has helped push sales of tax-paid cigarettes to unprecedented lows.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Backers of the current hike argue that it will raise needed revenue while discouraging smoking. The first claim is myopic, since the tax imposes costs on society in terms of lawlessness. The widespread availability of cheap cigarettes via the black market also undermines the second.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Patrick Fleenor is chief economist of the Tax Foundation and author of &amp;quot;Cigarette Taxes, Black Markets, and Crime,&amp;quot; published by the Cato Institute.&lt;/em&gt; &lt;/p&gt;</description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 26 Apr 2008 00:00:00 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>A Modest Proposal for Raising Education Revenue in Arkansas Without a Lottery</title>
<link>http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/22991.html</link>
<description> &lt;p&gt;Lieutenant Governor&amp;nbsp;Halter recently revived the idea of starting a state lottery to raise money for scholarships. While state-run lotteries are certainly popular (42 states and D.C. have them), it might just make sense for Arkansas to take a different approach.&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;A lottery would require quite a bit of work to start up, so why not just take over a business that already exists in the state: selling cigarettes? &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The legislature could ban the sale of cigarettes by private vendors and open government-run and owned tobacco stores throughout the state, with a massive tax to raise scholarship money. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This plan would require widespread advertising, just like the advertising in states with lotteries.&amp;nbsp; We would like to suggest the following catchy jingle for the new Arkansas State Cigarette Advertising and Merchandising (A-SCAM) Agency: &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Buy Arkansas Cigarettes&lt;br /&gt;and your ash will become cash!&lt;br /&gt;For the students who want to read, &lt;br /&gt;a puff is enough&lt;br /&gt;to buy the books that they need!&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Or perhaps a simpler slogan would suffice: &amp;quot;Buy Arkansas State Cigarettes and light up a student's education!&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We understand that some people will oppose this plan&amp;mdash;people who don't care about education, obviously. The naysayers might argue that tobacco sales and marketing is not an appropriate activity for state governments.&amp;nbsp; Arkansas policymakers should respond with the same arguments that are used to defend state lotteries. Smoking is unhealthy, so why shouldn't the state raise money from people stupid enough to engage in such a dangerous activity (just like gambling)? Sure, the state already raises a small fortune from tobacco excise taxes, but why not go a step further? If the state has a monopoly on tobacco sales and advertises smoking heavily, imagine the revenue it could raise! &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;After all, if the tax code can't be used to make moral judgments about which consumer goods are &amp;quot;stupid&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;wrong&amp;quot; and to punish citizens who purchase those goods, then what is it for? &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Some goody-two-shoes might whine that the state would then actually need people to smoke.&amp;nbsp; But the Arkansas treasury is dependent on cigarette sales as it is.&amp;nbsp; Most legislators have already learned to walk the fine line between encouraging citizens to participate in an unhealthy activity to generate revenue and discouraging the activity through punitive taxes. &amp;nbsp;Policymakers in lottery states know plenty about this paradox.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Another benefit of this plan is that legislators will not have to call the revenue raised &amp;quot;tax revenue&amp;quot; or even acknowledge that the cigarette taxes are taxes. Since cigarettes will be sold only by the government, the state can call the revenue whatever it likes. After all, states with lotteries call their lottery revenue &amp;quot;miscellaneous revenue&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;profits,&amp;quot; even though it's actually implicit tax revenue; why should it be any different for State Cigarettes? This means that legislators who want to raise taxes without their constituents' knowledge will now have a handy way of doing so (and without violating that pesky no-new-taxes pledge!).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Best of all, since people who buy State Cigarettes will purchase them voluntarily, they will not realize they are being taxed and will not demand transparency in the tax system. Everyone knows that an item that's purchased &lt;em&gt;voluntarily&lt;/em&gt; cannot be taxed, because taxes are &lt;em&gt;mandatory.&lt;/em&gt; That's how it works with state lotteries, according to lottery proponents, so the same logic will most certainly apply to State Cigarettes. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Opponents of this plan, just like opponents of lotteries, will no doubt claim that the revenue raised will be a form of regressive taxation disproportionately burdening the poor. They may also claim that a high tax rate on an item enjoyed by a subset of the population is unfair, since taxes pay for public services enjoyed by everyone. They might even have the audacity to allege that the revenue from State Cigarettes might not be used entirely for education since earmarked revenue is fungible, including lottery revenue. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pro-State-Cigarette policymakers should simply attack their opponents for not caring about education, which is the only thing that matters. Anyone who cares about raising money for Arkansas students will enthusiastically support any plan that lets the state run and advertise a monopoly business with a high, regressive tax (not accurately labeled a tax) on one particular, potentially unhealthy consumer good. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Relying solely on cigarette smokers might be a gamble, but isn't it the only way to &amp;quot;light up a student's education&amp;quot;?&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 11 Mar 2008 00:00:00 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Supreme Court Backs Railroad, Throws Out Tax Assessment</title>
<link>http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/22975.html</link>
<description> &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;(The following article originally appeared in the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=22717&quot;&gt;February 2008 edition of the Heartland Institute's Budget &amp;amp; Tax News&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/em&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In a decision establishing stronger protection for railroads from discriminatory state taxes, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in favor of CSX Transportation, a national railroad company that was hit with a huge jump in property taxes in Georgia. In December the court ruled unanimously for the railroad.&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt;Supported by a friend-of-the-court brief from the Tax Foundation, a national tax research group, CSX successfully argued Georgia's assessment method effectively gutted federal law that protects railroads from discriminatory taxes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Spurious Assessment Method&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;The case, &lt;em&gt;CSX Transportation v. Ga. Bd. of Equalization&lt;/em&gt;, dates to 2002, when Georgia hired a new utilities property assessor. Using new assessment methods he calculated a 36 percent increase in CSX's assessed value over 2001, which led to a 47 percent increase in the firm's property tax bill even though there was little actual change in the property.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;CSX argued the assessor's method was flawed, and an assessment expert testified other methods would have been more accurate.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;CSX was able to bring a lawsuit because railroads are protected by a federal law--the &amp;quot;4-R Act&amp;quot;--from discriminatory state taxation.&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt;The 4-R Act dates to the 1970s, when states punitively taxed captive railroads so badly that many were failing. The law prevents states from taxing more of a railroad's &amp;quot;true market value&amp;quot; than they do for other commercial property. If a state is taxing railroads at 80 percent of their value but other commercial property at only 40 percent, the tax violates federal law.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Threat to Protections&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Both the trial court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals sided with Georgia. They held that nothing in the 4-R Act allows railroads to challenge the assessment method. In attempting to prove the existence of discrimination, the courts held, railroads are limited to &amp;quot;checking the math&amp;quot; and finding a calculation error in the state's chosen assessment method.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;CSX appealed, and the Tax Foundation's brief in support argued the lower court's reasoning would eviscerate the 4-R Act's purpose, meaning, and text.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;Discriminatory assessment methods cannot be shielded from legal challenge because Congress has exercised its power to limit states' ability to use any conceivable method of assessing and taxing railroad transportation property,&amp;quot; the brief stated. &amp;quot;Otherwise, states would get immunity for even absurd assessment schemes, like basing it on the property's height above sea level.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt;A unanimous Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held for CSX. Chief Justice John Roberts, who delivered the Court's opinion, echoed the Tax Foundation's argument.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;'Total Lack of Support'&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;The total lack of textual support for Georgia's position is not surprising,&amp;quot; the opinion states. &amp;quot;The dichotomy the State presses would eviscerate the statute by forcing courts to defer to the valuation estimate of the State, when discriminatory taxation by States was the very evil the Act aimed to ban.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;The Tax Foundation's brief emphasized judges should be able to consider all available evidence in determining whether discrimination exists. Excluding evidence that the state's chosen method is skewed simply makes it more likely a discriminatory state taxation system can persist.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;Tax legislation should be based on careful economic analysis and transparent procedures,&amp;quot; the Tax Foundation argued in the brief. &amp;quot;Permitting criticism and challenge can help ensure neutrality, simplicity, and fairness in our tax system.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt;The Court's opinion recognized that, noting &amp;quot;preventing courts from scrutinizing valuation methodologies would render [the 4-R Act] a largely empty command.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Similar Tax Discrimination&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;CSX is not alone in facing discriminatory property taxation. Florida's practice of imposing higher property taxes on out-of-state landowners is currently pending in the state courts, and a Pennsylvania judge recently held Allegheny County's property tax assessment scheme is so disproportionate as to violate the state constitution.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;hr /&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Joseph D. Henchman&lt;/em&gt; &lt;em&gt;is tax counsel at the Tax Foundation, a national nonpartisan tax research organization in Washington, DC.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt; 		 		</description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 01 Mar 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
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<title>In For A Penny...: Book Review of &quot;FairTax: The Truth - Answering the Critics&quot;</title>
<link>http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/23032.html</link>
<description> &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;(The following book review originally appeared in the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nypost.com/seven/02102008/postopinion/postopbooks/in_for_a_penny_____561446.htm?page=0&quot;&gt;February 10, 2008 edition of the New York Post&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/em&gt;&lt;script language=&quot;JavaScript&quot; type=&quot;text/javascript&quot;&gt;ord=Math.random()*10000000000000000;   adid=&quot;&quot;;   hfpg=&quot;&quot;; &lt;/script&gt;&lt;script language=&quot;JavaScript&quot; type=&quot;text/javascript&quot;&gt;document.write('&lt;script language=&quot;JavaScript&quot; src=&quot;http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/nyp.postopinion;comp=' + adid + ';pos=menusky1;sz=160x600;dcove=d;tile=1;ord=' + ord + '?&quot; type=&quot;text/javascript&quot;&gt;&lt;/script&gt;&lt;script language=&quot;JavaScript&quot; src=&quot;http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/nyp.postopinion;comp=;pos=menusky1;sz=160x600;dcove=d;tile=1;ord=8719491243787849?&quot; type=&quot;text/javascript&quot;&gt;&lt;/script&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mike Huckabee's success on Super Tuesday was a godsend for a new book by talk-show host Neil Boortz and Rep. John Linder of Georgia, &amp;quot;FairTax: The Truth.&amp;quot;&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;p&gt;This sequel to their 2005 bestseller, &amp;quot;The FairTax Book,&amp;quot; once again urges the nation to repeal most federal taxes in favor of a national retail sales tax. Huckabee is the one major candidate who has embraced the idea and the new book claims that zealous FairTax supporters helped him win the Iowa caucus. He also won the primary in Georgia where Boortz and Linder are based and where support for the FairTax is strongest. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Like many movie sequels, the new offering spends too much time repeating the original. It's subtitled &amp;quot;Answering the Critics&amp;quot; and is written in Q&amp;amp;A form. But if Huckabee remains on the national stage, these arguments will soon graduate from tax journals to TV, so it doesn't hurt to hear the pros and cons in this format. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Boortz's talk-radio style makes for a fast read. But with it come exaggerations. The IRS could be abolished, the authors say, and they snidely assign the nation's tax collectors one final duty: &amp;quot;The IRS should be expected to stick around until it has completed its one remaining mandate: collecting taxes still due from the era of the income tax. Passage of the FairTax should not be viewed as an amnesty for past tax cheats.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And there are some personal accusations too: that the critics are just lobbyists or income tax scholars trying to protect their &amp;quot;natural habitat,&amp;quot; that is, the inside-the-beltway environment where tax gurus manipulate peoples' income taxes for their own gain. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Boortz and Linder see themselves as having grabbed a tiger by the tail. No mere policy proposal to them, the FairTax is a movement that's opening the eyes of thousands of people every day, proving how much damage the federal tax system is doing to our economy, our privacy and our government. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The four taxes they aim to replace are the two income taxes, personal and corporate, plus the payroll tax and the estate tax. That's $2.5 trillion this year, which is no paltry sum to raise with a sales tax. But the current tax code sets such a low bar for the FairTax to clear that Boortz and Linder are able to tee off on its obvious flaws: &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;n Complexity and cronyism. Individuals and companies with identical incomes often owe dramatically different amounts of tax because of the credits, exemptions and deductions that litter the tax code. Lobbyists keep it that way. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;n Economic waste. Economists have long believed that taxing people when they spend - not when they earn - is a better way for the government to raise money, so these &amp;quot;consumption taxes&amp;quot; like the FairTax have an economic advantage. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;n Privacy. The IRS must intrude to enforce an income tax, but a payer of sales tax is anonymous. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yet despite the dreadful status quo, there are serious criticisms of the Fair Tax. Economist William Gale at the left-leaning Brookings Institution took the lead with an assault on the published FairTax rate, 23 percent on almost all goods and services, asserting that it's unrealistically low. And from the right, President Bush's 2005 Tax Reform Commission explicitly rejected the FairTax for similar reasons. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Free-market economist Bruce Bartlett recently chimed in with an across-the-board denunciation, including an allegation that the FairTax movement was started by Scientologists. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Boortz and Linder dismiss Bartlett's claim out of hand, and they do an excellent job of skewering Rudy Giuliani's claim that we should preserve the income tax for the sake of its most popular loophole, the mortgage interest deduction. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;To the common charge that people could easily evade the FairTax, Boortz and Linder say that large retailers would go along: &amp;quot;In America, 3.6 percent of all companies - 92,334 firms - collectively make 85.7 percent of all sales. It's more important for the owners of those companies to stay in business and out of jail than it is to help you avoid paying the FairTax.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Boortz and Linder, though, spend the bulk of the book rebutting charges that the FairTax would shift the tax burden down the income scale. The reading gets more academic here, as the authors lean heavily on the writings of Boston University economist Lawrence Kotlikoff, the FairTax's most prominent academic defender. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Would the FairTax hurt the poor by taking away income tax credits? No, Boortz and Linder brag, the FairTax system is better for the poor because it includes a monthly check for all expenses up to the poverty level, which they call a &amp;quot;prebate.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Won't taxing services fail, as it has in some states? Isn't it nonsensical to tax government purchases? Won't the &amp;quot;prebate&amp;quot; be a massive, corrupt government check-writing program? &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The criticisms are numerous, and some of the answers are too glib. But the need for fundamental tax reform is undeniable, and the FairTaxers are committed to this worthy cause. If Huckabee's star continues to ascend, we're all going to need to know a little about the fundamental tax reform plan that he claims can turn the economy around. &lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;William Ahern is communications director for the Tax Foundation.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt; 		 		 		 		</description>
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<pubDate>Sun, 10 Feb 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
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<title>State Property Tax Debates Heating Up</title>
<link>http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/22956.html</link>
<description> &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;(The following article originally appeared in the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=22444&quot;&gt;January 2008 edition of the Heartland Institute's Budget &amp;amp; Tax News&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;/em&gt;With the recent rise in home values and property tax bills across the country, the property tax debate has heated up in several states.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;According to a 2006 Tax Foundation poll, property taxes are the form of state and local taxation most loathed by the public. Current property tax discontent is reminiscent of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when property tax caps, including California's Proposition 13 and similar measures, were debated and passed in many states.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Three States Take Lead&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;Three states--Florida, Georgia, and Indiana--are leading the current push for some version of property tax reform.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Some lawmakers, including Indiana Gov. Mitch Daniels (R), are offering plans that would shift revenue collection from localities to state governments, thus moving the government entity that controls tax rates (and spending) farther from the people.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Daniels and his Commission on State Tax and Financing Policy are looking at both short- and long-term fixes to the state's property tax dilemma. Their plan, released in late October, would cap the residential property tax at 1 percent of assessed value and business properties at 3 percent by 2009. The plan also adds a homestead deduction of 35 percent in 2009, shifts some school costs to the state, and replaces elected township and county assessors with an appointed assessor in each county.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Although Daniels' plan would limit growth in local spending in accordance with a county's average personal income over a six-year period, it would also raise the state's sales tax from 6 to 7 percent.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;House Speaker Pat Bauer (D-South Bend) worries an increase in the sales tax may hurt middle-income families and the poor. He told Indianapolis News 6 TV, &amp;quot;The big question whenever you increase a tax like sales tax is who wins and who loses.&amp;quot; Nonetheless, Democrats in the state appear cautiously supportive of Daniels' plan.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Some Want Tax Abolished&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;Some policy advocates are going further than Daniels, calling for outright abolition of Indiana's property tax. Daniels has said he will not support eliminating property taxes because doing so would necessitate a large increase in income taxes.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Gerald Prante, an economist at the Tax Foundation, says eliminating the property tax would endanger the state's fiscal health. &amp;quot;While abolishing the property tax may sound good, if you want to reduce taxes you have to reduce spending,&amp;quot; Prante said. &amp;quot;Unless spending is cut, eliminating the property tax will merely shift the tax burden onto some other tax, which may be worse than the property tax.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Prante added, &amp;quot;Furthermore, eliminating the property tax, which is relied upon by local governments, will transfer power to the state government on the issue of taxation, thereby reducing or even eliminating tax competition within the state, as well as reducing the chances that one's voice will be effective in changing tax policy.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Georgia May Dismantle Tax&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;Georgia, too, is considering legislation to dismantle the property tax system in the state.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Glenn Richardson (R-Hiram), speaker of the House, has proposed the GREAT (Georgia's Repeal of Every Ad Valorem Tax) Plan, a constitutional amendment under which property taxes would be replaced by extending the current 4 percent sales tax to services and by eliminating all sales tax exemptions.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;The plan is projected to generate the same amount of revenue as the property tax, but the revenue would be remitted to the state and not directly to local governments. Richardson notes on the GREAT Plan's Web site, &amp;quot;It is not our intent to cut taxes, but rather, to reform the system of taxation in Georgia.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Because the plan is proposed as a constitutional amendment, it requires a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly and approval by the state's voters in a ballot measure.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Local officials &lt;em&gt;have opposed the plan. &amp;quot;Decisions should be made at home, not at the Dome,&amp;quot; Dr. Steve Smith, Lowndes County Schools superintendent, told the Valdosta Daily Times&lt;/em&gt;. &amp;quot;The state will be the financial winner and the local government will be the loser because the power will be given to Atlanta,&amp;quot; he warned.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Florida Voters Have Say&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;In late October, Florida lawmakers passed a reform plan that will be on the January ballot for voters to approve.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;The measure would double the $25,000 homestead exemption to $50,000, allow more portability of tax cap savings under the Save Our Homes initiative, and impose a 10 percent cap on assessments for non-homestead property. The plan is expected to save the average homeowner about $240 a year.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;A proposal that would have eliminated property tax payments for lower-income senior citizens was dropped from the final plan by the Senate. Because Florida does not have an income tax, revenue at the state level may be made up by a sales tax increase, unless there is a decrease in spending.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Florida Tax Watch, a nonpartisan research group, said the plan does not cut taxes and therefore is not &amp;quot;true tax reform.&amp;quot; In a statement on its Web site, the group notes, &amp;quot;heaping savings on homesteaders may naturally disincentive them from participating to try to keep local government spending under control.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Policy analysts largely agree that when control of taxation and spending is shifted from localities to the state, localities have less influence. To cut property taxes effectively, spending must be curbed as well, they say. Otherwise, the revenue is likely to be recouped through another form of taxation, and likely one that is not as visible to voters.&lt;/p&gt;		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		</description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
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<title>Tax Foundation's Wish List for Tax Policy in 2008</title>
<link>http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/22831.html</link>
<description> &lt;p&gt;The Tax Foundation staff has released its wish list for tax policy in the new year. Since 2008 is an election year in which a predicted economic slowdown could put pressure on some government budgets, reporters and politicians are likely to give the public a double dose of tax policy. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Special interests will, as always, push tax policies that favor themselves at the expense of other taxpayers. Social engineers will continue pushing tax policies that redistribute money based upon health, age, income, and other demographics. And finally, gimmicks like tax holidays and&amp;nbsp;tiny, overhyped tax cuts will be&amp;nbsp;featured&amp;nbsp;in legislatures and&amp;nbsp;political campaigns. Champions of sound tax policy like yours truly&amp;nbsp;at the Tax Foundation will view all these policies with a skeptical eye.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Our Wish List for Tax Policy in 2008&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1&lt;/strong&gt;. Politicians will stop playing word games, and call taxes &amp;quot;taxes&amp;quot; and not &amp;quot;fees,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;surcharges,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;profits.&amp;quot; Any assessment that raises money in excess of what is needed to defray costs is a tax.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2&lt;/strong&gt;. Politicians will stop using the tax code to give even more preferential treatment to sectors like housing and healthcare that are already tax-pampered.&amp;nbsp;This includes using&amp;nbsp;the tax code as a bailout for homeowners.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3&lt;/strong&gt;. Elected officials in state governments seeking to give property tax relief to homeowners will not do so merely by shifting to some other source of tax revenue like sales or income (which usually ends up as a tax increase) or by shifting it all to commercial property owners.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;4&lt;/strong&gt;. Members of Congress will finally realize that two oceans can't protect us from the tax competition sweeping the rest of the world. China is now the latest country to cut its corporate tax rate. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;5.&lt;/strong&gt; Politicians will stop raising taxes on arbitrarily targeted items like cigarettes, alcohol, bottled water, soda, tasty food, adult entertainment, gambling, etc. just because they want to raise revenue for some government program that is supposed to provide broad public benefits. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;6&lt;/strong&gt;. State officials will stop obstructing our national market by attempting to export taxes to &amp;quot;out-of-staters.&amp;quot; States should attract investment with pro-growth policies, not by protectionist penalties on the productive.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;7&lt;/strong&gt;. At least one of the states that have recently considered lottery privatization will go through with a sale (not a lease!). That will reverse the&amp;nbsp;domino effect of state governments going into the business of promoting gambling.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;8&lt;/strong&gt;. States&amp;nbsp;will eliminate gimmicks like sales tax holidays and instead lower sales tax rates for the entire year.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;9&lt;/strong&gt;. TaxReformPanel.gov and TaxFoundation.org will be the most visited web sites of 2008, and our ultimate wish...&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;10&lt;/strong&gt;. Congress will&amp;nbsp;avoid another AMT ping-pong match in late 2008, instead acting in the public interest by passing fundamental tax reform that merges the good features of the AMT (a broader tax base and lower tax rates) into the regular tax code.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 27 Dec 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
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<title>Don't Assume the U.S. Supreme Court Accepts Economic Nexus</title>
<link>http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/22824.html</link>
<description>       &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;(The following article originally appeared in the &lt;a href=&quot;http://services.taxanalysts.com/taxbase/tbnews.nsf/Go?OpenAgent&amp;amp;2007+STT+243-6&quot;&gt;December 17, 2007 edition of State Tax Notes&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/em&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;To the Editor:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Andrew W. Swain and John D. Snethen suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to hear four economic nexus appeals indicates that the Court &amp;quot;remains content to allow the states to develop...economic nexus.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;_ednref1&quot; href=&quot;#_edn1&quot; title=&quot;_ednref1&quot;&gt;[i]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p&gt;This conclusion is unwarranted.  The Supreme Court receives over 7,000 appeals per year, and hears less than 100.  This does not mean that the Court approves of the lower court ruling in 98.5% of cases appealed, but simply that they don't have the time to consider all of them.  The Court itself has put it best:  &amp;quot;The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;_ednref2&quot; href=&quot;#_edn2&quot; title=&quot;_ednref2&quot;&gt;[ii]&lt;/a&gt;  The Court later explained further:&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;We have repeatedly indicated that a denial of certiorari means only that, for one reason or another which is seldom disclosed, and not infrequently for conflicting reasons which may have nothing to do with the merits and certainly may have nothing to do with any view of the merits taken by a majority of the Court, there were not four members of the Court who thought the case should be heard.&lt;a name=&quot;_ednref3&quot; href=&quot;#_edn3&quot; title=&quot;_ednref3&quot;&gt;[iii]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;    &lt;p&gt;Further, the real problem may be that the Supreme Court often does not get fired up about tax cases.  Paul Caron, now editor of TaxProf Blog, has summarized this:&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;The view that tax law is less interesting or important than other areas of law pervades even the Supreme Court.  For example, one proffered explanation for Justice Marshall's productivity in the tax field is that the conservative Chief Justices under whom he served refused to assign him more important cases: &amp;quot;Justice Marshall was forced to write on federal income tax because he was given nothing better to do.&amp;quot;  Other members of the Court apparently share this view of tax law.  For example, when asked why he sings along with the Chief Justice at the Court's annual Christmas party, Justice Souter replied, &amp;quot;I have to.  Otherwise I get all the tax cases.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;_ednref4&quot; href=&quot;#_edn4&quot; title=&quot;_ednref4&quot;&gt;[iv]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;    &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Quill &lt;/em&gt;held that the states cannot impose sales tax collection and compliance burdens on an out-of-state business merely for having customers in the state.  Swain and Snethen applaud recent state moves to tax &amp;quot;income&amp;quot; (measured entirely by sales in-state, so really a tax on sales) on businesses with no property or employees in the state, and who pay taxes to other states where they &lt;em&gt;are&lt;/em&gt; located.  It's exactly the same as &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;-states attempting to damage interstate commerce as they pursue their own parochial interest.  Such a formalistic tweak does not remedy the serious constitutional problem.&lt;a name=&quot;_ednref5&quot; href=&quot;#_edn5&quot; title=&quot;_ednref5&quot;&gt;[v]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p&gt;Because there is real uncertainty out there as states embrace economic nexus and other schemes to boost tax revenues at the expense of our national economy, I hope the Supreme Court does reconsider its recent denials of certiorari in future nexus cases.  But Swain, Snethen, state revenue departments, and other advocates of economic nexus are celebrating a bit prematurely if they treat silence as an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;      &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;Joseph Henchman &lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Joseph Henchman is Tax Counsel at the Tax Foundation, Washington.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;br clear=&quot;all&quot; /&gt;  &lt;hr width=&quot;33%&quot; size=&quot;1&quot; /&gt;      &lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_edn1&quot; href=&quot;#_ednref1&quot; title=&quot;_edn1&quot;&gt;[i]&lt;/a&gt; Andrew W. Swain and John D. Snethen, &lt;em&gt;Paying Their Fair Share: The Hidden Lesson of Complete Auto and Quill&lt;/em&gt;, 46 State Tax Notes 749 (Dec. 10, 2007), &lt;em&gt;at&lt;/em&gt; http://services.taxanalysts.com/taxbase/tbnews.nsf/Go?OpenAgent&amp;amp;2007+STT+238-2.&lt;/p&gt;      &lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_edn2&quot; href=&quot;#_ednref2&quot; title=&quot;_edn2&quot;&gt;[ii]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;United States&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt; v. Carver&lt;/em&gt;, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923).&lt;/p&gt;      &lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_edn3&quot; href=&quot;#_ednref3&quot; title=&quot;_edn3&quot;&gt;[iii]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;Brown v. Allen&lt;/em&gt;, 344 U.S. 443, 491-92 (1953).  &lt;/p&gt;      &lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_edn4&quot; href=&quot;#_ednref4&quot; title=&quot;_edn4&quot;&gt;[iv]&lt;/a&gt; Paul L. Caron, &lt;em&gt;Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers&lt;/em&gt;, 13 Va. Tax. Rev. 517, 525 (1994).&lt;/p&gt;      &lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;_edn5&quot; href=&quot;#_ednref5&quot; title=&quot;_edn5&quot;&gt;[v]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;See generally &lt;/em&gt;Joseph D. Henchman, &lt;a href=&quot;/news/show/22785.html&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Why the Quill Physical Presence Rule Shouldn't Go the Way of Personal Jurisdiction&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, 46 State Tax Notes 387 (Nov. 5, 2007), &lt;em&gt;at &lt;/em&gt;http://services.taxanalysts.com/taxbase/tbnews.nsf/Go?OpenAgent&amp;amp;2007+STT+215-4.&lt;/p&gt;        &lt;div&gt;&lt;div id=&quot;edn5&quot;&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;MsoEndnoteText&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;   		 		</description>
<guid isPermaLink="false">22824@http://www.taxfoundation.org</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 17 Dec 2007 00:00:00 EST</pubDate>
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<title>Why the Quill Physical Presence Rule Shouldn't Go the Way of Personal Jurisdiction</title>
<link>http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/22785.html</link>
<description> &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;(The following article originally appeared in the &lt;/em&gt; &lt;em&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://services.taxanalysts.com/taxbase/tbnews.nsf/Go?OpenAgent&amp;amp;2007+STT+215-4&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;November 5, 2007 edition of State Tax Notes&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/em&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;I. Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;If a Delaware company sells its products to customers in West Virginia, which state has the power to tax the transaction? Should it matter if the company has no employees or buildings in West Virginia? If the company sells products in all 50 states, should all 50 be able to impose their taxes on the company? &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In 2006, Americans spent $108.7 billion in online retail transactions, a 23 percent increase from the year before and 2.8 percent of total sales. Although that proportion is still small, it is growing quickly, and the increasing role of the Internet is challenging traditional legal concepts. As the world becomes less concerned with geographic boundaries, legal concepts premised on geographic lines -- such as personal jurisdiction and state taxes -- have grown more strained. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Personal jurisdiction -- the place where a defendant can be sued -- was once dominated by a physical presence rule. A state's ruling against a defendant could not be enforced unless he (or his property) was present in the state, because no state could reach beyond its territory. But in its landmark decision in &lt;em&gt;International Shoe&lt;/em&gt;,&lt;a name=&quot;F1&quot; href=&quot;#1&quot; title=&quot;F1&quot;&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the physical presence rule and adopted a defendant-specific multifactor fairness inquiry, focusing on &amp;quot;the defendant's &lt;em&gt;past&lt;/em&gt; conduct . . . , such as employing forum residents, renting forum property, and shipping products to the forum.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F2&quot; href=&quot;#2&quot; title=&quot;F2&quot;&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; If there are &amp;quot;minimum contacts,&amp;quot; and it does not &amp;quot;offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,'&amp;quot; the nonpresent defendant can be sued. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In the 62 years since, the Court has tried in a series of cases to revise and restate those factors to reduce the unpredictability and confusion its rulings have caused. Nevertheless, its rulings have been described as &amp;quot;erratic,&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F3&quot; href=&quot;#3&quot; title=&quot;F3&quot;&gt;[3]&lt;/a&gt; a &amp;quot;doctrinal muddle,&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F4&quot; href=&quot;#4&quot; title=&quot;F4&quot;&gt;[4]&lt;/a&gt; &amp;quot;inconsistent,&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F5&quot; href=&quot;#5&quot; title=&quot;F5&quot;&gt;[5]&lt;/a&gt; and &amp;quot;a mess.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F6&quot; href=&quot;#6&quot; title=&quot;F6&quot;&gt;[6]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Perhaps cognizant of that mess, the Court has stuck to a physical presence rule (the &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt; rule) for determining when an out-of-state retailer can be compelled to pay taxes to a state or collect use taxes on purchases. But as states increasingly seek to tax nonresidents, especially for Internet transactions, &amp;quot;states are pushing for judicial adoption of economic nexus. Supported by some academics, economic nexus is a defendant-specific multifactor fairness inquiry much like that in &lt;em&gt; International Shoe&lt;/em&gt;. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The attacks against physical presence nexus are a mistake. Embracing economic nexus would repeat the personal jurisdiction mess and destroy reliance interests and legal certainty. Overruling the &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt; rule would usher in decades of confusion, running the risk of damaging the national economy. The Supreme Court has preferred to leave resolution of that issue to Congress, but congressional inactivity and state overreaching may make judicial action necessary. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Part II describes the confusion in personal jurisdiction from 1945 to the present. Part III explains the &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt; physical presence rule in state taxation, and looks at academic and state criticism of that rule. Part IV argues that preserving the &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt; rule is beneficial because it does not inflict damaging uncertainty on businesses, consumers, and those who give legal advice.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;text-align: center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;II. The Mess of Personal Jurisdiction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;On Ninth Street in Columbia, Mo., a town of 96,000 (including 33,000 students) and home of the annual Ragtime and Jazz Festival, Richard King opened a small cabaret club, The Blue Note, in 1980. By 1996 business was good and King decided to set up a Web site for the club. Shortly thereafter, he learned that the Bensusan Restaurant Co. of Manhattan had filed a lawsuit against him, in New York federal court, for violating its &amp;quot;The Blue Note&amp;quot; trademark registered in 1985. King's only contact with New York was that his Web site could be accessed from that state.&lt;a name=&quot;F7&quot; href=&quot;#7&quot; title=&quot;F7&quot;&gt;[7]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;div align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;  &lt;table align=&quot;right&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; cellpadding=&quot;5&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; id=&quot;AutoNumber2&quot; style=&quot;border-width: 0pt; border-collapse: collapse&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;   &lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;   &lt;td width=&quot;10%&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/td&gt;    &lt;td style=&quot;border-left-style: double; border-left-width: 10px&quot; width=&quot;90%&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;    &amp;quot;Embracing economic nexus would repeat    the personal jurisdiction mess and destroy reliance interests and legal    certainty.&amp;quot;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;   &lt;/tr&gt;  &lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;p&gt;Courts have long been sympathetic to people like King, who face the expense and worry of defending (often meritless) lawsuits in a faraway place. The U.S. Constitution's due process clause has been held to protect such individuals &amp;quot;against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum&amp;quot; by ensuring that states do not &amp;quot;reach out beyond the limits imposed on them . . . in a federal system.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F8&quot; href=&quot;#8&quot; title=&quot;F8&quot;&gt;[8]&lt;/a&gt; That principle -- that it is unfair to be sued in a state where one has virtually no connections -- is generally undisputed. The problem arises in drawing the line separating &amp;quot;virtually no connections&amp;quot; from &amp;quot;sufficient minimum contacts.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The historical line was physical presence. Looking at the due process clause, the Court explained that &amp;quot;proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F9&quot; href=&quot;#9&quot; title=&quot;F9&quot;&gt;[9]&lt;/a&gt; Unless a defendant appeared in person, enforcing a judgment against him was considered so unfair that it violated the U.S. Constitution. If there was such a judgment, other states could refuse to enforce it as an abuse of power. At the dawn of the 20th century, scholar Thomas M. Cooley summarized the rule in his &lt;em&gt; Constitutional Limitations&lt;/em&gt; (1903): &amp;quot;No state has authority to invade the jurisdiction of another, and by service of process compel parties there resident or being to submit their controversies to the determination of its courts.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The physical presence rule in personal jurisdiction encountered difficulties regarding property, motorists, and corporations. States could seize (attach) the in-state property of an out-of-state defendant pending the outcome of the case, provided the state gave notice to the owner. While those &amp;quot;in rem&amp;quot; actions (as well as divorce actions, which were treated similarly) were within the confines of the physical presence rule, it allowed states to reach defendants who lived outside the state. Courts also developed the concept of implied consent to allow states to reach outside their borders to prosecute nonresident motorists who inflicted damages or injury within the state. By driving on the state's roads, a motorist was held to have automatically consented to jurisdiction over any lawsuits that might arise from the driving, although he had to receive notice of the lawsuit.&lt;a name=&quot;F10&quot; href=&quot;#10&quot; title=&quot;F10&quot;&gt;[10]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt; The physical presence rule was stretched the most in suits involving corporate defendants, because corporations are a legal fiction and their physical existence is intangible. Some states required that corporations appoint an agent to receive service of process, and if a corporation was &amp;quot;present&amp;quot; without such an appointment, a state official was designated to receive service of process on its behalf. Determining presence became the critical question. &amp;quot;Under both the presence theory and the implied consent theory, the first question to be asked was whether the corporation was 'doing business' within the state. . . . '[D]oing business' gradually came to be a test in and of itself.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F11&quot; href=&quot;#11&quot; title=&quot;F11&quot;&gt;[11]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In 1945 in &lt;em&gt;International Shoe&lt;/em&gt;, the Court abandoned the physical presence rule in favor of a defendant-specific multifactor fairness inquiry. The inquiry focuses &amp;quot;primarily on the defendant's &lt;em&gt;past conduct&lt;/em&gt; . . . , such as employing forum residents, renting forum property, and shipping products to the forum&amp;quot; (emphasis added). If there are sufficient &amp;quot;minimum contacts&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,'&amp;quot; the nonpresent defendant can be sued. Although that was clearly an attempt to fix the law, by unmooring personal jurisdiction from physical presence, &amp;quot;the Court has been unable to develop a coherent doctrine.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F12&quot; href=&quot;#12&quot; title=&quot;F12&quot;&gt;[12]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The doctrinal twists in a few cases depict that incoherence. In &lt;em&gt;McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co.&lt;/em&gt;,&lt;a name=&quot;F13&quot; href=&quot;#13&quot; title=&quot;F13&quot;&gt;[13]&lt;/a&gt; the Court held that a Texas insurance company's one policy with a Californian constituted sufficient minimum contact with the state: &amp;quot;Residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable.&amp;quot; The Court dismissed concerns that the defendant would be forced to defend a suit in a distant forum. Prof. Kevin C. McMunigal described &lt;em&gt;McGee&lt;/em&gt; as giving &amp;quot;equal attention to prospective factors never mentioned in &lt;em&gt;International Shoe&lt;/em&gt;, including the forum's interest in regulating the defendant's conduct, the &lt;em&gt;plaintiffs' inconvenience&lt;/em&gt; in using an alternate forum, and the likely location of witnesses.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F14&quot; href=&quot;#14&quot; title=&quot;F14&quot;&gt;[14]&lt;/a&gt; More broadly, &amp;quot;the Court has regularly added new factors in a process of gradual accumulation, each addition aggravating the test's ambiguity and complexity. . . . [ &lt;em&gt;McGee&lt;/em&gt; ] foreshadowed two persistent problems in minimum contacts doctrine: the unexplained addition of new factors and the inconsistent shifting of temporal viewpoint.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F15&quot; href=&quot;#15&quot; title=&quot;F15&quot;&gt;[15]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Both problems arose again in &lt;em&gt;Hanson v. Deckla,&lt;/em&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;F16&quot; href=&quot;#16&quot; title=&quot;F16&quot;&gt;[16]&lt;/a&gt; in which the Court focused on whether the defendant had deliberately intended to conduct activities in the forum state. &amp;quot;It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.&amp;quot; That test -- purposeful availment -- was reiterated in &lt;em&gt;World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson&lt;/em&gt;,&lt;a name=&quot;F17&quot; href=&quot;#17&quot; title=&quot;F17&quot;&gt;[17]&lt;/a&gt; in which the Court held that it was the &lt;em&gt;only&lt;/em&gt; test. Concerns about federalism, the burden on the defendant, and the plaintiff's interest in having a day in court were held to be not separate tests but rather outgrowths of the &amp;quot;minimum contacts&amp;quot; question. Further, purposeful availment was defined not as earning revenue from a state or knowing that one's products will end up in the state, but rather whether it would be reasonable to anticipate a court case within the state. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The defendant's due process concerns and the forum state's interest in the litigation became separate concerns again in &lt;em&gt;Burger King Co. v. Rudzewicz&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;a name=&quot;F18&quot; href=&quot;#18&quot; title=&quot;F18&quot;&gt;[18]&lt;/a&gt; There, the Court held that purposeful availment was not decisive, but that it created a presumption about minimum contacts that the defendant could rebut if he demonstrated &lt;em&gt;fundamental unfairness&lt;/em&gt;. Unable to define that term, the Court seemed exasperated by its generality: &amp;quot;We . . . reject any talismanic jurisdictional formulas; the facts of each case must always be weighed in determining whether personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.&amp;quot; The opinion was also unclear regarding &amp;quot;whether the critical mental state in minimum contacts is one of purpose, awareness, or inadvertence.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F19&quot; href=&quot;#19&quot; title=&quot;F19&quot;&gt;[19]&lt;/a&gt; Two justices dissented. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The rules became muddled further by &lt;em&gt;Calder v. Jones&lt;/em&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;F20&quot; href=&quot;#20&quot; title=&quot;F20&quot;&gt;[20]&lt;/a&gt; and by a divided Court in &lt;em&gt;Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Court&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;a name=&quot;F21&quot; href=&quot;#21&quot; title=&quot;F21&quot;&gt;[21]&lt;/a&gt; In &lt;em&gt;Calder&lt;/em&gt;, the Court held that the national sale of a magazine provided sufficient minimum contacts for jurisdiction in a libel case. In contrast, in &lt;em&gt;Asahi&lt;/em&gt;, the main opinion of four justices held when a company reasonably expected that its product would reach the forum state, it was not purposeful availment, although it was a sufficient minimum contact. However, jurisdiction could &lt;em&gt;not&lt;/em&gt; be exercised if it was unreasonable and unfair to do so, taking into account the burden on the defendant, the forum state's interests, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, efficient resolution of the controversy, and the states' interest in furthering social policies.&lt;a name=&quot;F22&quot; href=&quot;#22&quot; title=&quot;F22&quot;&gt;[22]&lt;/a&gt; Four other justices agreed that the factors were relevant, but rejected a balancing test in favor of an absolute rule that placing products in the stream of commerce was purposeful availment sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction. A ninth justice would have decided the case simply on fairness grounds. Five justices thus valued fairness over minimum contacts. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;div align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;  &lt;table align=&quot;right&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; cellpadding=&quot;5&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; id=&quot;AutoNumber2&quot; style=&quot;border-width: 0pt; border-collapse: collapse&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;   &lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;   &lt;td width=&quot;10%&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/td&gt;    &lt;td style=&quot;border-left-style: double; border-left-width: 10px&quot; width=&quot;90%&quot;&gt;    &lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;&amp;quot;Some but not all remnants of the physical presence    rule have been swept away.&amp;quot;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;   &lt;/tr&gt;  &lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;p&gt;Some but not all remnants of the physical presence rule have been swept away. Although a court seizing in-state property of a defendant without minimum contacts violates due process,&lt;a name=&quot;F23&quot; href=&quot;#23&quot; title=&quot;F23&quot;&gt;[23]&lt;/a&gt; in-state service on a nonresident individual does not.&lt;a name=&quot;F24&quot; href=&quot;#24&quot; title=&quot;F24&quot;&gt;[24]&lt;/a&gt; The latter rule has been criticized as a return to territorial lines, from which the doctrine was supposedly moving away. &amp;quot;After 110 years as a nonissue, the defendant's ability to foresee suit in the forum state grew in less than ten years to become the sine qua non of jurisdiction.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F25&quot; href=&quot;#25&quot; title=&quot;F25&quot;&gt;[25]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;However, the Court's use of defendant-specific factors has also been heavily criticized. &amp;quot;The fact-intensive nature of the foreseeability inquiry and the uncertainty of its outcome, paradoxically, leave defendants unable to predict whether they can afford to default, while raising the barriers of entry to the courthouse for plaintiffs unable to afford multistate litigation.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F26&quot; href=&quot;#26&quot; title=&quot;F26&quot;&gt;[26]&lt;/a&gt; Cases switch results multiple times during appeals, and that fact encourages appeals in other cases.&lt;a name=&quot;F27&quot; href=&quot;#27&quot; title=&quot;F27&quot;&gt;[27]&lt;/a&gt; Business and litigation become more costly because potential defendants cannot foresee what will happen. &amp;quot;Unstable and unpredictable legal doctrine inhibits the convergence of the parties' estimates of the case value, thus inhibiting settlement.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F28&quot; href=&quot;#28&quot; title=&quot;F28&quot;&gt;[28]&lt;/a&gt; That uncertainty has inhibited the growth of e-commerce. &amp;quot;The justices' utter lack of agreement . . . makes the doctrine exceedingly difficult to apply to new and unforeseen situations, such as transactions occurring in whole or in part in cyberspace.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F29&quot; href=&quot;#29&quot; title=&quot;F29&quot;&gt;[29]&lt;/a&gt; Seemingly reluctant to make a bad situation worse, the Court has absented itself from personal jurisdiction law since 1990. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The early hopes that &lt;em&gt;International Shoe&lt;/em&gt; and its progeny would replace a &amp;quot;mechanical, formalistic&amp;quot; rule with a &amp;quot;modern, realistic&amp;quot; rule have been dashed by 62 years of &amp;quot;split opinions, loaded footnotes, and convoluted opinions. . . . [T]he applause and admiration for the Court's forays into the field of jurisdiction have long ago given way to a distinct disenchantment.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F30&quot; href=&quot;#30&quot; title=&quot;F30&quot;&gt;[30]&lt;/a&gt; From that experience, commentators, legislators, and judges should be wary of calls for upheaval in another area of law based solely on the argument that the rule is arcane or formalistic, particularly if there is no consensus on a replacement.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;text-align: center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;III. The &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt; Physical Presence Nexus Rule &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;and Criticism of It&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;In its opinion finding tax liability for an out-of-state corporation with no presence, tangible or intangible, in West Virginia on income realized out-of-state by that corporation for accounts kept out-of-state, the majority, in its opinion, boldly goes where no court has gone before.&amp;quot; So writes Justice Brent Benjamin of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, dissenting from a ruling to uphold the levy of over a quarter million dollars in state taxes on a company whose only connection to West Virginia is that some of its customers now live there. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In June 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case, which involved FIA Card Services (formerly MBNA America Bank and now owned by Bank of America). Although a quarter-million dollars may not be considered much for a company whose profits that year were over $1 billion, MBNA has paid taxes on all that income to the state where it was headquartered: Delaware. If every state were to impose similar taxes on every company, the negative impact on the economy would be serious. And although MBNA had property, offices, and 28,000 employees around the world, none of them were in West Virginia. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;div align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;  &lt;table align=&quot;right&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; cellpadding=&quot;5&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; id=&quot;AutoNumber2&quot; style=&quot;border-width: 0pt; border-collapse: collapse&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;   &lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;   &lt;td width=&quot;10%&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/td&gt;    &lt;td style=&quot;border-left-style: double; border-left-width: 10px&quot; width=&quot;90%&quot;&gt;    &lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;&amp;quot;Legislators and judges should be wary of calls for    upheaval in another area of law based solely on the argument that the rule    is arcane or formalistic, particularly if there is no consensus on a    replacement.&amp;quot;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;   &lt;/tr&gt;  &lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;MBNA America Bank N.A. v. Tax Commissioner of the State of West Virginia&lt;/em&gt; is only the latest attempt to undermine a constitutional rule that states cannot impose taxing obligations on companies that are not physically present in the state. Those obligations can include paying corporate income tax (as is disputed in &lt;em&gt;MBNA&lt;/em&gt;), or being forced to collect sales or use taxes for a state from out-of-state consumers (struck down as unconstitutional in &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;F31&quot; href=&quot;#31&quot; title=&quot;F31&quot;&gt;[31]&lt;/a&gt;). State officials are eager to tax out-of-state companies, to increase government spending by shifting tax burdens to faceless businesses and out-of-towners with no ballot box recourse. Consequently, the states have embraced a concept that would allow them to do it. West Virginia's bold and extreme action is part of the natural progression of an academic concept called economic nexus. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;A. From Complete Bar to &lt;em&gt;Complete Auto&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt; The U.S. Constitution came about in large part because the federal government initially had no power to stop states from setting up trade barriers between each other. States' power over commerce, &amp;quot;guided by inexperience and jealousy, began to show itself in iniquitous laws and impolitic measures . . ., destructive to the harmony of the States, and fatal to their commercial interests abroad. This was the immediate cause that led to the forming of a convention.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F32&quot; href=&quot;#32&quot; title=&quot;F32&quot;&gt;[32]&lt;/a&gt; Among the powers granted to Congress in the new Constitution was that &amp;quot;to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,&amp;quot; a provision known as the commerce clause. Congress and the courts thus have the power to strike down laws that discriminate against interstate commerce.&lt;a name=&quot;F33&quot; href=&quot;#33&quot; title=&quot;F33&quot;&gt;[33]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Nevertheless, states still have incentives to impede interstate commerce. &amp;quot;Perceived tax exportation is a valuable political tool for state legislators, permitting them to claim that they provide government services for free.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F34&quot; href=&quot;#34&quot; title=&quot;F34&quot;&gt;[34]&lt;/a&gt; The critical question therefore is at what point permissible interstate competition becomes impermissible discrimination. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The Supreme Court began with a formal rule: States cannot tax or impede interstate commerce at all. &amp;quot;A State is . . . precluded from taking any action which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between States.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F35&quot; href=&quot;#35&quot; title=&quot;F35&quot;&gt;[35]&lt;/a&gt; That blanket prohibition began to erode in the 1950s, when the Court treated essentially identical taxes differently based on &amp;quot;magic words&amp;quot; in the statute. For example, an annual license tax imposed on the in-state gross receipts of an out-of-state company was invalidated as discriminating against interstate commerce, but an identical tax imposed as a franchise tax on in-state going concern value, measured by in-state gross receipts, was upheld as valid.&lt;a name=&quot;F36&quot; href=&quot;#36&quot; title=&quot;F36&quot;&gt;[36]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Justices and scholars became dissatisfied with a legal test that simply rewarded draftsmanship while missing the important question: &amp;quot;whether the challenged tax produced results forbidden by the commerce clause.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F37&quot; href=&quot;#37&quot; title=&quot;F37&quot;&gt;[37]&lt;/a&gt; Consequently, the Court abandoned its formal rule in 1977 and announced the &lt;em&gt; Complete Auto&lt;/em&gt; test to delineate when a tax on interstate commerce is valid: &lt;/p&gt; &lt;ul type=&quot;disc&quot;&gt;  &lt;li&gt;nexus: a sufficient connection between the taxpayer and the  state; &lt;/li&gt;  &lt;li&gt;fair apportionment: the state cannot tax beyond its fair  share of the taxpayer's income; &lt;/li&gt;  &lt;li&gt;nondiscrimination: the state must not impose burdens on  out-of-state taxpayers but not in-state taxpayers; and &lt;/li&gt;  &lt;li&gt;related to services: the tax must be fairly related to  services provided to the taxpayer by the state.&lt;/li&gt; &lt;/ul&gt; &lt;p&gt;The nexus requirement -- the first prong of &lt;em&gt;Complete Auto&lt;/em&gt; -- was discussed by the Court three weeks later, when it reaffirmed a rule from the earlier case of &lt;em&gt;National Bellas Hess&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;a name=&quot;F38&quot; href=&quot;#38&quot; title=&quot;F38&quot;&gt;[38]&lt;/a&gt; There, the Court had struck down an effort by Illinois to require an out-of-state company to collect compensating use taxes on all sales made to Illinois residents. &amp;quot;In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens on National in this case, we would have to repudiate totally the sharp distinction . . . between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State, and those who do no more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business.&amp;quot; Unless a company has offices, employees, or other property in a state, it does not have nexus under &lt;em&gt;Complete Auto&lt;/em&gt; and cannot be subject to use tax obligations. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The Court's opinion in &lt;em&gt;National Bellas Hess&lt;/em&gt; also discussed practical considerations:&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-left: 50px; margin-right: 50px&quot;&gt;If Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes. The many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping requirements could entangle National's interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose &amp;quot;a fair share of the cost of the local government.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F39&quot; href=&quot;#39&quot; title=&quot;F39&quot;&gt;[39]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The Court seemed concerned not only about the danger that mail-order companies would be subject to multiple taxation and a heavy administrative burden, but that states had no legitimate power to impose taxation obligations on companies that were not physically present in the state in some way. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;B. &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt; During the 1980s some academics criticized &lt;em&gt;Bellas Hess&lt;/em&gt; and the physical presence rule as arcane, formalistic, and outmoded. Some state courts agreed and simply disregarded the decision. &amp;quot;The economic, social, and commercial landscape upon which &lt;em&gt;Bellas Hess&lt;/em&gt; was premised no longer exists, save perhaps in the fertile imaginations of attorneys representing mail order interests. . . . The burgeoning technological advances of the 1970s and 1980s have created revolutionary communications abilities and marketing methods which were undreamed of in 1967.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F40&quot; href=&quot;#40&quot; title=&quot;F40&quot;&gt;[40]&lt;/a&gt; However, the number of jurisdictions imposing sales taxes had increased from 2,300 to more than 6,000, and an efficient and inexpensive way for small businesses to track sales tax rates, bases, and exemptions remained elusive, despite technological advances. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In 1992, in &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;, the Supreme Court took up those academic and state challenges, and reaffirmed the physical presence rule. The case involved a Delaware office supplies company with some $1 million in sales to 3,000 customers in North Dakota, but no employees or property in the state; all deliveries were made by mail or common carrier. North Dakota was one of 34 states that had enacted tax obligations on nonpresent companies, up from 11 at the time of &lt;em&gt;Bellas Hess&lt;/em&gt;. &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt; arrested that trend, with the Court giving several reasons for its decision. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;First, the Court emphasized the nexus requirement of &lt;em&gt; Complete Auto&lt;/em&gt;. By requiring a connection between a taxing state and a company, nexus &amp;quot;ensure[s] that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce.&amp;quot; In North Dakota, any company that advertised three times in the state became obligated to collect taxes for the state, and the Court described that obligation as a burden on interstate commerce. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Second, the Court discussed &amp;quot;the continuing value of a bright-line rule.&amp;quot; The physical presence rule &amp;quot;firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes.&amp;quot; One thinks of the personal jurisdiction mess, and perhaps the Court's desire to avoid repeating it in another area of law. &amp;quot;The continuing value of a bright-line rule in this area and the doctrine and principles of &lt;em&gt;stare decisis&lt;/em&gt; indicate that the &lt;em&gt; Bellas Hess&lt;/em&gt; rule remains good law.&amp;quot; Justice Antonin Scalia separately wrote that the only litigation that seemed to arise in 25 years of applying &lt;em&gt;Bellas Hess&lt;/em&gt; were state efforts to overrule it: &amp;quot;Concern that reaffirmance of &lt;em&gt; Bellas Hess&lt;/em&gt; will lead to a flurry of litigation over the meaning of 'physical presence,' seems to me contradicted by 25 years of experience under the decision.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Third, the Court expressed concern about disrupting settled expectations. &amp;quot;A bright-line rule in the area of sales and use taxes also encourages settled expectations and, in doing so, fosters investment by businesses and individuals&lt;em&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&amp;quot; Justices Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion basing their decision on a refusal to upset those expectations: &amp;quot;Having affirmatively suggested that the 'physical presence' rule could be reconciled with our new jurisprudence, we ought not visit economic hardship upon those who took us at our word.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The Court also clarified that the physical presence rule is grounded in the commerce clause; due process clause arguments are governed by the minimum contacts rule of personal jurisdiction. &amp;quot;The requirements of due process are met irrespective of a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing State.&amp;quot; While the Quill Corp. had sufficient minimum contacts to be within the &lt;em&gt;jurisdiction&lt;/em&gt; of the state under the due process clause, its lack of physical presence was insufficient nexus to be within the &lt;em&gt;taxing power&lt;/em&gt; of the state under the commerce clause. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Because the rule is grounded in the commerce clause, the Court noted that Congress has the power to alter it. &amp;quot;No matter how we evaluate the burdens that use taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusion.&amp;quot; Justice Scalia was even more direct: &amp;quot;Congress has the final say over regulation of interstate commerce, and it can change the rule of &lt;em&gt;Bellas Hess&lt;/em&gt; by simply saying so.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Justice Byron White dissented, calling physical presence &amp;quot;anachronistic,&amp;quot; &amp;quot;artificial,&amp;quot; and not premised on &amp;quot;economic reality.&amp;quot; He favored abandoning all nexus inquiry beyond the minimum contacts rule of personal jurisdiction. White had been in the &lt;em&gt;Bellas Hess&lt;/em&gt; majority; his change of heart arose primarily out of a sense of injustice at the fact that some sales escape taxation, and the erroneous belief that technological change has made keeping track of thousands of tax laws, rates, and exemptions no longer burdensome. Citing the &lt;em&gt;states&lt;/em&gt;' legal briefs as expert authority, White asserted that &amp;quot;the costs of compliance . . ., in light of today's modern computer and software technology, appear to be nominal.&amp;quot; Although White indicated some concern about retroactive collection of taxes if the physical presence rule was abandoned, he did not even address the likelihood that multiple states will seek to tax the same companies and the same sales. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;C. Post-&lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt; Academics and states have criticized the physical presence rule reaffirmed in &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt; and have sought to overturn it. For instance, scholar John Swain argues, &amp;quot;[S]ales tax equity can be fully achieved only if &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;'s anachronistic physical presence test is either judicially or legislatively overruled.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F41&quot; href=&quot;#41&quot; title=&quot;F41&quot;&gt;[41]&lt;/a&gt; Those criticisms echo the dissenters in &lt;em&gt;Bellas Hess&lt;/em&gt; and &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;, and embrace a concept known as &amp;quot;economic nexus.&amp;quot; &amp;quot;'Economic nexus' is an umbrella term that commonly refers to the assertion of jurisdiction based on something other than physical presence in the taxing state.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F42&quot; href=&quot;#42&quot; title=&quot;F42&quot;&gt;[42]&lt;/a&gt; It first appeared in the &lt;em&gt;Bellas Hess&lt;/em&gt; dissent, where Justice Abe Fortas argued that nexus exists if an &amp;quot;out-of-state company is engaged in exploiting the local market on a regular, systematic, large-scale basis.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F43&quot; href=&quot;#43&quot; title=&quot;F43&quot;&gt;[43]&lt;/a&gt; That starting point has since been refined by commentators, using factors such as &amp;quot;the presence of intangible property or affiliates, or, in some cases, simply the derivation of economic benefit from the state's residents.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F44&quot; href=&quot;#44&quot; title=&quot;F44&quot;&gt;[44]&lt;/a&gt; Other factors can include the &amp;quot;number of customers in the state, value of assets or deposits in the state, and receipts attributable to sources in the state.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F45&quot; href=&quot;#45&quot; title=&quot;F45&quot;&gt;[45]&lt;/a&gt; Yet another idea is an &lt;em&gt;Asahi&lt;/em&gt;-like inquiry into &amp;quot;the frequency, quantity and systematic nature of a taxpayer's economic contacts with a state&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F46&quot; href=&quot;#46&quot; title=&quot;F46&quot;&gt;[46]&lt;/a&gt; to determine if there is sufficient nexus to subject the activity to that state's taxation. At least one academic would make the test circular: &amp;quot;Taxable activity should imply nexus.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F47&quot; href=&quot;#47&quot; title=&quot;F47&quot;&gt;[47]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Some lower court cases have used economic nexus. In &lt;em&gt; Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission&lt;/em&gt;, South Carolina imposed a corporate income tax on Geoffrey Inc., a Delaware company with no employees, offices, or property in the state.&lt;a name=&quot;F48&quot; href=&quot;#48&quot; title=&quot;F48&quot;&gt;[48]&lt;/a&gt; Geoffrey held the trademarks of its parent, Toys &amp;quot;R&amp;quot; Us Inc., to which it leased them back for a royalty. The result was that much of the profit earned in South Carolina Toys &amp;quot;R&amp;quot; Us stores was paid to the subsidiary, which paid (lower) taxes in Delaware. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the taxation of Geoffrey, ruling that it had accounts receivable in South Carolina -- essentially, nexus exists wherever there is someone who owes Geoffrey money. Geoffrey thus had &amp;quot;contemplated and purposefully sought the benefit of economic contact with&amp;quot; South Carolina. The primary reason for finding nexus, however, was that Geoffrey had licensed intangibles in the state. &amp;quot;It is well settled that the taxpayer need not have a tangible, physical presence in a state for income to be taxable there. The presence of intangible property alone is sufficient to establish nexus.&amp;quot; Other states have also used the in-state &amp;quot;presence&amp;quot; of intangibles to justify taxation of out-of-state companies.&lt;a name=&quot;F49&quot; href=&quot;#49&quot; title=&quot;F49&quot;&gt;[49]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Affiliate nexus is another approach, albeit a less used one. &amp;quot;Under this theory, a nonresident corporation is subject to tax in a state based on the nexus of affiliated entities. Affiliated entities can include a parent, a subsidiary, or other affiliate.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F50&quot; href=&quot;#50&quot; title=&quot;F50&quot;&gt;[50]&lt;/a&gt; For instance, had South Carolina adopted that approach, Geoffrey would be subject to state taxation because its parent company, Toys &amp;quot;R&amp;quot; Us, has physical presence in the state. New Jersey has upheld taxation of a subsidiary not physically present in the state on that basis. However, unless a state has chosen to disregard corporate forms and adopt combined reporting, which states are reluctant to do for fear of appearing antibusiness, courts have been reluctant to adopt affiliate-based economic nexus. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Broadest of all has been the approach taken by West Virginia in &lt;em&gt;MBNA&lt;/em&gt; -- that a nonpresent company is subject to taxation simply if it has customers present in the state. The state court had ruled, &amp;quot;MBNA's systematic and continuous business activity in this State produced significant gross receipts attributable to its West Virginia customers which indicate a significant economic presence sufficient to meet the substantial nexus prong of &lt;em&gt;Complete Auto&lt;/em&gt;.&amp;quot; The court controversially asserted that &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;'s physical presence rule applies narrowly only to sales and use taxes and not to taxation and interstate commerce generally. Prof. R. Todd Ervin has criticized that approach, arguing that imposing a &lt;em&gt;collection duty&lt;/em&gt; should not receive greater scrutiny than imposing a &lt;em&gt;tax obligation&lt;/em&gt;, and Justice Benjamin noted that &lt;em&gt;Complete Auto&lt;/em&gt; mentions only sales and use taxes, but no one claims that its nexus rule is not applicable to all state taxation.&lt;a name=&quot;F51&quot; href=&quot;#51&quot; title=&quot;F51&quot;&gt;[51]&lt;/a&gt; Other courts who have considered West Virginia's rule have rejected it.&lt;a name=&quot;F52&quot; href=&quot;#52&quot; title=&quot;F52&quot;&gt;[52]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The Supreme Court's decision not to accept the &lt;em&gt;MBNA&lt;/em&gt; appeal suggests that the Court prefers that Congress give the next word on the physical presence rule after &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;. Although the conflict between Tennessee's and West Virginia's rules may result in Supreme Court consideration, a congressional revision seems more likely at present. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Preferring that route, some scholars have been less confrontational about the &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt; rule and instead have focused on pushing for greater uniformity in state tax codes. &amp;quot;If a more uniform sales and use tax regime were in place, or if the specter of thousands of local jurisdictions were removed, the commerce clause nexus standard would approach the due process standard, and the physical presence test would be obviated.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F53&quot; href=&quot;#53&quot; title=&quot;F53&quot;&gt;[53]&lt;/a&gt; Frustrated by congressional inaction in overruling &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;, states set up the Streamlined Sales Tax Project in 1999 to &amp;quot;(1) significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the current compliance and administrative burdens imposed upon remote sellers; and (2) preserve state and local sovereignty.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F54&quot; href=&quot;#54&quot; title=&quot;F54&quot;&gt;[54]&lt;/a&gt; The enormous task of attempting to simplify or eliminate differences in the 7,400-plus sales taxing jurisdictions in the United States has had some limited progress. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In 2003 the Council On State Taxation graded the SSTP's progress and found that it had done well in developing uniform base definitions (although some are still complex and counterintuitive; for instance, &amp;quot;candy&amp;quot; does not include licorice), uniform exemption rules, a central administration framework, rules protecting retailers from class-action liability in the event of erroneous tax overcharging, and governance.&lt;a name=&quot;F55&quot; href=&quot;#55&quot; title=&quot;F55&quot;&gt;[55]&lt;/a&gt; However, COST criticized the SSTP for not linking tax jurisdictions to five-digit ZIP code boundaries, reimbursing vendors for collection duties, or prohibiting states from shifting tax complexity into other taxes (such as Minnesota's new &amp;quot;fur tax&amp;quot; on fur sales). As for the state corporate income tax, COST said that states are moving away from uniformity. &amp;quot;For several years, states have been trending away from uniformity, as more and more states moved from three-factor equally weighted [tax] formulas, to formulas that double weight the sales factor, and finally to single sales factor formulas. . . . [M]uch of this blame can be placed on state legislatures responding to parochial self-interests of in-state corporate taxpayers.&amp;quot; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;div align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;  &lt;table align=&quot;right&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; cellpadding=&quot;5&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; id=&quot;AutoNumber2&quot; style=&quot;border-width: 0pt; border-collapse: collapse&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;   &lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;   &lt;td width=&quot;10%&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/td&gt;    &lt;td style=&quot;border-left-style: double; border-left-width: 10px&quot; width=&quot;90%&quot;&gt;    &lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;&amp;quot;If one advocates tax liability based on economic    activity without regard to geography, the tax system should not be defined    by geography.&amp;quot;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;   &lt;/tr&gt;  &lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;p&gt;Simplification is not a foregone conclusion, and vague references to technological change as somehow eliminating the burden of reporting and paying discriminatory taxes do not justify abandoning the physical presence standard. That some transactions escape state taxation should not be a justification for imposing the onerous burden of a system forever defined by geography:&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-left: 50px; margin-right: 50px&quot;&gt;What these commentators fail to take entirely into account, however, is the &amp;quot;skill of contemporary man and his machines&amp;quot; in designing and operating new forms of commerce that further complicate the remote collection burden. It is a fundamental truth that state tax systems will constantly be playing catch-up to technological improvements in the market place. Unless and until a new system of state taxation is devised that is not based entirely on geographic boundaries, we will continue to face the inherent conflict of &amp;quot;old economy&amp;quot; tax systems imposed upon &amp;quot;new economy&amp;quot; commerce.&lt;a name=&quot;F56&quot; href=&quot;#56&quot; title=&quot;F56&quot;&gt;[56]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;As long as state tax systems are defined by geographical lines, consistency requires that taxes be imposed only on individuals and businesses within those geographical lines. If one advocates tax liability based on economic activity without regard to geography, the tax system should not be defined by geography. But states prefer to raise taxes on individuals and businesses outside their territory as a way to export tax burdens to nonvoters and discriminate against out-of-state business activity. An economic nexus rule is therefore inherently discriminatory within the context of our state tax systems.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;text-align: center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;IV. The Virtues of &lt;em&gt; Quill&lt;/em&gt; and the Dangers of&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Economic Nexus&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Abandoning the physical presence rule in &lt;em&gt;International Shoe&lt;/em&gt; led to confusion and uncertainty, resulting in an area of law in which no one is sure what the rules are. Abandoning the &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt; physical presence rule would result in the same. By replacing the physical presence rule in personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court had to confront the necessity of identifying which factors should henceforth be considered. Alarmingly, the Court has become less coherent over time, which does not bode well for the future coherence of economic nexus doctrine. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The reality is that courts are not well equipped to develop new rules of taxation. Courts may not, and in some cases cannot, obtain evidence from interested stakeholders and take political and economic factors into consideration when developing doctrine. &amp;quot;Congressional processes are more accommodative, affording the whole industry hearings and an opportunity to assist in the formulation of new legislation. . . . The whole scope of congressional action would be known long in advance and effective dates for the legislation could be set in the future without the injustices of retroactivity and surprise which might follow court action.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F57&quot; href=&quot;#57&quot; title=&quot;F57&quot;&gt;[57]&lt;/a&gt; Because the &lt;em&gt; Quill&lt;/em&gt; rule is premised on the commerce clause, it is subject to congressional change, which could be more comprehensive and accountable than any judicial pronouncement. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;div align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;  &lt;table align=&quot;right&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; cellpadding=&quot;5&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; id=&quot;AutoNumber2&quot; style=&quot;border-width: 0pt; border-collapse: collapse&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;   &lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;   &lt;td width=&quot;10%&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/td&gt;    &lt;td style=&quot;border-left-style: double; border-left-width: 10px&quot; width=&quot;90%&quot;&gt;    &lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;&amp;quot;Courts are not well equipped to develop new rules of    taxation. Courts may not, and in some cases cannot, obtain evidence from    interests stakeholders and take political and economic factors into    consideration when developing doctrine.&amp;quot;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;   &lt;/tr&gt;  &lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;p&gt;Doctrine is developed case by case, and the facts of a particular case may preclude completeness or coherence. &amp;quot;As we have seen, the Court's ability to fine-tune an economic nexus rule is limited, and the Court's ruling may also be limited by the particular facts of the case that arrives at its steps.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F58&quot; href=&quot;#58&quot; title=&quot;F58&quot;&gt;[58]&lt;/a&gt; Combined with the fact that the Supreme Court is averse to tax cases in the first place, there is a high danger that any move away from the physical presence rule will do no good. There are five particular concerns regarding economic nexus. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;First, applying geography-based income taxes or geography-based sales taxes with a standard unconstrained by geography risks multiple taxation and burdensome compliance costs. In personal jurisdiction, the location of an Internet transaction remains disputed. If a New York company sells a product on its Web site to a California purchaser via servers in Ohio and Colorado, the transaction can be described as being everywhere, nowhere, or always somewhere at a given point in time.&lt;a name=&quot;F59&quot; href=&quot;#59&quot; title=&quot;F59&quot;&gt;[59]&lt;/a&gt; For the same reason, economic nexus threatens to tax transactions everywhere; even taxing transactions somewhere can be burdensome to figure out. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;States have responded by trying to tax whatever they can reach -- hardly the new and innovative development tax officials describe it as. &amp;quot;State tax systems . . . have not kept up with the e-commerce revolution -- not through lack of effort by state tax administrators, but because the systems are inherently based on geographic borders, a concept that is simply ineffective in a borderless electronic economy.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F60&quot; href=&quot;#60&quot; title=&quot;F60&quot;&gt;[60]&lt;/a&gt; The &lt;em&gt;MBNA&lt;/em&gt; court took that to the extreme by suggesting the commerce clause itself is outdated: &amp;quot;The Framers' concept of commerce consisted of goods transported in horse-drawn, wooden-wheeled wagons or ships with sails. They lived in a world with no electricity, no indoor plumbing, . . . no iPods.&amp;quot; While some constitutional principles surely must be revisited to apply them to new circumstances, the idea that parochial state interests cannot burden interstate commerce remains a timeless principle regardless of how sophisticated technology may be. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Second, simply imposing the existing taxation regime on e-commerce would burden e-commerce more than bricks-and-mortar businesses:&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-left: 50px; margin-right: 50px&quot;&gt;If Congress enacts legislation that essentially overturns &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;, such legislation would create an undue burden by requiring many e-retailers to collect use taxes from hundreds of thousands of consumers nationwide and comply with thousands of different tax codes. Main Street retailers, however, need comply only with the tax code of the jurisdiction in which they conduct business. To reduce costs, e-retailers would likely shift the burden to consumers by increasing prices. Moreover, imposing those administrative and financial burdens may force smaller online companies out of business or discourage businesses from engaging in e-commerce.&lt;a name=&quot;F61&quot; href=&quot;#61&quot; title=&quot;F61&quot;&gt;[61]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Under either nexus rule, a bricks-and-mortar store needs to worry only about the tax system where it is physically present.&lt;a name=&quot;F62&quot; href=&quot;#62&quot; title=&quot;F62&quot;&gt;[62]&lt;/a&gt; Economic nexus imposes additional obligations for each jurisdiction into which an item is sold; it is &amp;quot;effectively . . . an export duty on outbound commerce.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F63&quot; href=&quot;#63&quot; title=&quot;F63&quot;&gt;[63]&lt;/a&gt; Those burdens become excessive when one accounts for the vastly different state rules as to what is or is not taxed. Support for economic nexus is usually justified as a way to end inequity between electronic and physical retailers.&lt;a name=&quot;F64&quot; href=&quot;#64&quot; title=&quot;F64&quot;&gt;[64]&lt;/a&gt; But without enormous advances in simplification, states using an economic nexus rule will burden electronic commerce more than bricks-and-mortar businesses, and courts should be suspicious of a standard that allows states to do so. &amp;quot;Congress must strike a delicate balance between fostering an emerging Internet market and protecting states' powers to tax. . . . If it is determined that additional state taxes cannot be imposed on the Internet without significantly damaging the market, then no new taxes should be allowed.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F65&quot; href=&quot;#65&quot; title=&quot;F65&quot;&gt;[65]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;div align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;  &lt;table align=&quot;right&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; cellpadding=&quot;5&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; id=&quot;AutoNumber2&quot; style=&quot;border-width: 0pt; border-collapse: collapse&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;   &lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;   &lt;td width=&quot;10%&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/td&gt;    &lt;td style=&quot;border-left-style: double; border-left-width: 10px&quot; width=&quot;90%&quot;&gt;    &lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;&amp;quot;The idea that parochial state interests cannot    burden interstate commerce remains a timeless principle regardless of how    sophisticated technology may be.&amp;quot;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;   &lt;/tr&gt;  &lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;p&gt;Third, there is a high likelihood that e-commerce would become subject to multiple taxation under an economic nexus standard. &amp;quot;Under any nexus analysis, multiple taxing jurisdictions may have power over a remote seller. To avoid multiple taxation, only one state may actually exercise that power.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F66&quot; href=&quot;#66&quot; title=&quot;F66&quot;&gt;[66]&lt;/a&gt; A physical presence rule makes that easy; an economic nexus rule complicates matters. In &lt;em&gt;MBNA&lt;/em&gt;, West Virginia sought to tax income that is already subject to Delaware income tax. Even though the second prong of &lt;em&gt;Complete Auto&lt;/em&gt; is meant to prevent a state from taxing beyond its fair share, multiple states will nevertheless assert that they are entitled to tax the income. States are unlikely to smooth out such agreements for the same reasons that rules for divvying up state corporate income taxes have become less uniform. &amp;quot;Because of the tension in interests between money market states (states that are importers of financial services) and money center states (states that are net exporters of such services), any future agreement on a single method of allocating and apportioning income among financial institutions seems unlikely.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F67&quot; href=&quot;#67&quot; title=&quot;F67&quot;&gt;[67]&lt;/a&gt; Absent such an agreement, a judicial endorsement of economic nexus would invite multiple taxation and substantial litigation involving multiple states. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Fourth, how far in space and time economic nexus can go remains undetermined. One infamous personal jurisdiction case upheld service of process on an airplane flying over the state. &amp;quot;It cannot seriously be contended that a person moving in interstate commerce is on that account exempt from service of process while in transit, and we think it makes no practical difference whether he is traveling at the time on a plane, or on a bus or train, or in his own car.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F68&quot; href=&quot;#68&quot; title=&quot;F68&quot;&gt;[68]&lt;/a&gt; Physical presence in state taxation imposes some limits on how far state taxation power can extend. If an economic nexus rule is adopted, there is a danger that geographical limits will be abandoned, resulting in states unfairly subjecting nonresidents to excessive taxation. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Temporal limits, also, could subject nonresident companies to uncertainty. &amp;quot;How long does nexus last? There is little guidance in this area, and states' responses vary widely. Three states have publicized twelve months as the duration of nexus for sales and use tax collection purposes, the State of Washington has a five year duration of nexus regulation, two states have ruled that nexus ends on the day the physical presence ends, and in Indiana, nexus apparently lasts forever.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F69&quot; href=&quot;#69&quot; title=&quot;F69&quot;&gt;[69]&lt;/a&gt; If courts embrace state taxation of nonresident companies, it will be difficult to curtail such expansive rules in an orderly fashion; determining how far is too far or how long is too long is a question of policy, not constitutional command. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;div align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;  &lt;table align=&quot;right&quot; border=&quot;0&quot; cellpadding=&quot;5&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; id=&quot;AutoNumber2&quot; style=&quot;border-width: 0pt; border-collapse: collapse&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;   &lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;   &lt;td width=&quot;10%&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/td&gt;    &lt;td style=&quot;border-left-style: double; border-left-width: 10px&quot; width=&quot;90%&quot;&gt;    &lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;&amp;quot;Any judicial endorsement of economic nexus would    involve curtailment of electronic commerce; indeed, that is probably why    many brick-and-mortar retailers are eager for it.&amp;quot;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;   &lt;/tr&gt;  &lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;p&gt;Fifth, adopting an economic nexus standard would unsettle expectations and threaten retroactive application of taxes, endangering economic investments. &amp;quot;Taxpayers, mail order and Internet alike, rely on [physical presence] for 'settled expectations' in tax planning and compliance, as do the states; any change in the standard would result in many taxpayers finding themselves liable in far more states than they planned for.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F70&quot; href=&quot;#70&quot; title=&quot;F70&quot;&gt;[70]&lt;/a&gt; While the Internet has seen an increased amount of commerce, some seem to view it as a golden goose that can be squeezed without adverse effects. However, the availability of many items in electronic commerce could be affected if an economic nexus standard were adopted:&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-left: 50px; margin-right: 50px&quot;&gt;Just as the mail-order catalog business had grown prior to &lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;, so the financial services industry has expanded. . . . Without the availability of such credit, a great amount of which often crosses state lines, the growth of electronic commerce will be substantially hindered. An economic presence test would threaten income taxation in each state where credit was offered and, therefore, might tend to discourage creditors -- especially smaller, less wealthy creditors -- from extending credit in multiple states.&lt;a name=&quot;F71&quot; href=&quot;#71&quot; title=&quot;F71&quot;&gt;[71]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Any judicial endorsement of economic nexus would involve curtailment of electronic commerce; indeed, that is probably why many bricks-and-mortar retailers are eager for it. Many proponents of economic nexus have recognized the problems of economic nexus by outlining model schemes that have several common mitigating features, the imposition of which are beyond the judicial power. Those include de minimis exemptions, simplified rates, and uniform bases. Until Congress and the states can hammer out national rules on those and other areas of concern, a physical presence rule is the only nexus rule that avoids burdening interstate commerce. It should be upheld by the Supreme Court and by Congress. Overturning the present standard without being sure about what replaces it will repeat the mistake made by the progeny of &lt;em&gt; International Shoe&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;text-align: center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;V. Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;At least one commentator has written that &amp;quot;&lt;em&gt;Quill&lt;/em&gt;'s continued adherence to the 'physical presence' test is a relic from the pre-&lt;em&gt;International Shoe&lt;/em&gt; era.&amp;quot;&lt;a name=&quot;F72&quot; href=&quot;#72&quot; title=&quot;F72&quot;&gt;[72]&lt;/a&gt; With the knowledge of the mess that &lt;em&gt; International Shoe&lt;/em&gt; began when it abandoned a physical presence rule, courts, scholars, and businesses should be wary of calls to repeat it in another area of law. Commentators cannot agree on what shape economic nexus should take, and states cannot agree on how simplified their tax systems should be. Because they proceed case by case, courts are not well equipped to manage overhauling the U.S. taxation system with an economic nexus standard fraught with concerns. Attempting to do so would create confusion, unsettle expectations, and endanger the nation's economy -- damage much worse than any harm suffered by bricks-and-mortar businesses at present, and far worse than the uncertainty caused in the area of personal jurisdiction. Preventing states from inflicting such damage as they pursue parochial interests is, after all, the reason we have the commerce clause.&lt;br /&gt; &amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;FOOTNOTES&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;1&quot; href=&quot;#F1&quot; title=&quot;1&quot;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington&lt;/em&gt;, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;2&quot; href=&quot;#F2&quot; title=&quot;2&quot;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; Kevin C. McMunigal, &amp;quot;Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction,&amp;quot; 108 &lt;em&gt;Yale L.J.&lt;/em&gt; 189, 195 (1998) (emphasis added). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;3&quot; href=&quot;#F3&quot; title=&quot;3&quot;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Id.&lt;/em&gt; at 226. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;4&quot; href=&quot;#F4&quot; title=&quot;4&quot;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; Wendy Collins Perdue, &amp;quot;Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box,&amp;quot; 32 &lt;em&gt;B.C.L. Rev&lt;/em&gt;. 529, 532 (1991). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;5&quot; href=&quot;#F5&quot; title=&quot;5&quot;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Id.&lt;/em&gt; at 529-30. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;6&quot; href=&quot;#F6&quot; title=&quot;6&quot;&gt;6&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; Russell J. Weintraub, &amp;quot;Comments on the Roundtable Discussion of Choice of Law,&amp;quot; 48 &lt;em&gt;Mercer L. Rev.&lt;/em&gt; 871, 881 fn. 68 (1997). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;7&quot; href=&quot;#F7&quot; title=&quot;7&quot;&gt;7&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King&lt;/em&gt;, 126 F.3d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 1997). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;8&quot; href=&quot;#F8&quot; title=&quot;8&quot;&gt;8&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson&lt;/em&gt;, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;9&quot; href=&quot;#F9&quot; title=&quot;9&quot;&gt;9&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Pennoyer v. Neff&lt;/em&gt;, 95 U.S. at 733. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;10&quot; href=&quot;#F10&quot; title=&quot;10&quot;&gt;10&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;See, e.g.&lt;/em&gt;, &lt;em&gt; Hess v. Pawloski&lt;/em&gt;, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;11&quot; href=&quot;#F11&quot; title=&quot;11&quot;&gt;11&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; Jack H. Friedenthal, Arthur R. Miller, and John E. Sexton, &lt;em&gt;Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials,&lt;/em&gt; at 74 (8th Ed. 2001) John J. Cound, ed. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;12&quot; href=&quot;#F12&quot; title=&quot;12&quot;&gt;12&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; Perdue, &lt;em&gt;supra&lt;/em&gt; note 4, at 529-30. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;13&quot; href=&quot;#F13&quot; title=&quot;13&quot;&gt;13&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co.&lt;/em&gt;, 355 U.S. 220 (1957). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;14&quot; href=&quot;#F14&quot; title=&quot;14&quot;&gt;14&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; McMunigal, &lt;em&gt;supra&lt;/em&gt; note 2, at 196-97 (emphasis added). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;15&quot; href=&quot;#F15&quot; title=&quot;15&quot;&gt;15&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Id.&lt;/em&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;16&quot; href=&quot;#F16&quot; title=&quot;16&quot;&gt;16&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Hanson v. Deckla&lt;/em&gt;, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;17&quot; href=&quot;#F17&quot; title=&quot;17&quot;&gt;17&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson&lt;/em&gt;, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;18&quot; href=&quot;#F18&quot; title=&quot;18&quot;&gt;18&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Burger King Co. v. Rudzewicz&lt;/em&gt;, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;19&quot; href=&quot;#F19&quot; title=&quot;19&quot;&gt;19&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; McMunigal, &lt;em&gt;supra&lt;/em&gt; note 2, at 217. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;20&quot; href=&quot;#F20&quot; title=&quot;20&quot;&gt;20&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Calder v. Jones&lt;/em&gt;, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;21&quot; href=&quot;#F21&quot; title=&quot;21&quot;&gt;21&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Court&lt;/em&gt;, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;22&quot; href=&quot;#F22&quot; title=&quot;22&quot;&gt;22&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Id.&lt;/em&gt; at 113-14. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;23&quot; href=&quot;#F23&quot; title=&quot;23&quot;&gt;23&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Shaffer v. Heitner&lt;/em&gt;, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;24&quot; href=&quot;#F24&quot; title=&quot;24&quot;&gt;24&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Burnham v. Superior Court&lt;/em&gt;, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;25&quot; href=&quot;#F25&quot; title=&quot;25&quot;&gt;25&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; Katherine C. Sheehan, &amp;quot;Predicting the Future: Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century,&amp;quot; 66 &lt;em&gt;U. Cin. L. Rev.&lt;/em&gt; 385, 403 (1998). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;26&quot; href=&quot;#F26&quot; title=&quot;26&quot;&gt;26&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;Id.&lt;/em&gt; at 386. &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 10px; line-height: 150%&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt; &lt;a name=&quot;27&quot; href=&quot;#F27&quot; title=&quot;27&quot;&gt;27&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;em&gt;See&lt;/em&gt; Patrick J. Borchers, &amp;quot;Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe's Half-Buried Legacy,&amp;quot; 28 &lt;em&gt;U.C. Davis L. Rev&lt;/em&gt;. 561, 583 (1995). &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p s